TEHRAN – The signing of the Pakistan-mediated memorandum of understanding (MOU) between Iran and the U.S. dealt a great blow to the Israeli regime’s expectations from the Lebanese-Israeli negotiations.

This sharp shift was reflected in remarks by Yechiel Leiter, the Israeli ambassador to the United States and head of its negotiating delegation, before the opening of the fifth round of talks with Lebanese diplomats in Washington on Tuesday.

Leiter likened the negotiation process to “a train derailing from its intended track,” in what was widely seen as a direct criticism of the U.S. administration and President Donald Trump.

The regime's initial premise at the start of negotiations with Lebanon was that all parties, over the previous four rounds, had “boarded the same train heading in a clear direction: full peace and normalization between the two sides, the dismantling of Hezbollah, and the removal of its weapons.”

However, according to Leiter, that train risked going off the rails following the U.S.-Iran MOU. He warned that the Lebanese resistance has received a boost of encouragement and undoubtedly “feels stronger and bolder.”

Instead of focusing, from the Israeli perspective, on disarming Hezbollah, the objective of the Israeli-Lebanese negotiations had shifted to translating the U.S.-Iranian understandings into tangible measures on the ground.

This served to prevent any disruption to what Washington deems the more critical track: advancing discussions on the MOU toward a final agreement. This is especially relevant given Iran’s insistence on implementing the first clause of the MOU, which focuses on ending hostilities on all fronts, including Lebanon, with a ceasefire and withdrawal from occupied Lebanese territories, before moving forward on other issues outlined in the memorandum.

Leiter’s aggressive and sharp statements represented an escalation in the Israeli regime’s stance and clearly reflected its anger and dissatisfaction with the unfolding situation. The regime feared that the next step after solidifying a ceasefire would be demands for a full withdrawal from southern Lebanon, pushed through various Iranian formulas and maneuvers.

When Trump’s talks with Iran resulted in meeting the Iranian condition of including Lebanon in the ceasefire, Netanyahu’s cabinet and supporters slammed the Israeli prime minister for an embarrassing defeat in Lebanon.

But Netanyahu found no better option than the Lebanese government’s negotiating team, finding an escape route from the predicament Iran had imposed on him in Lebanon.

Under the cloak of preserving “Lebanese sovereignty” and the pretext of “blocking Iranian interference in Lebanon,” the Lebanese authorities handed themselves over to the Israeli delegation, which arrived armed with maps and conditions that it imposed on them, stripping Lebanon of its sovereignty and all its leverage.

Netanyahu thus achieved what he wanted, while the Lebanese authorities suffered disappointment and humiliation. In a formal agreement, they signed off on the regime’s illegal occupation of a significant part of Lebanese territory. This provided the occupying regime with additional leverage to continue blackmailing and pressuring Lebanese officials. Furthermore, Lebanese authorities signed off on a formal acknowledgment of their concessions after decades in which such positions were prohibited and criminalized. The two sides are officially still at war.

The stone Netanyahu hurled at the head of the Lebanese negotiating delegation struck more than one bird, which he proudly boasted on Saturday as achievements gained against Lebanon at the negotiating table. The first of these gains is that as Israeli Occupation Forces (IOF) withdraw from “two pilot zones,” the IOF redeploys and adjusts to curb attrition from Hezbollah strikes should tensions escalate in the future.

As long as the regime entrusts the Lebanese army with the task of removing Hezbollah and its resistance fighters from these zones and preventing their return, this could, according to Israeli hopes and under pressure, lead to a transformation in the Lebanese army’s functional role and weaponry, shifting from protecting Lebanon’s independence to internal infighting.

Any deal that pits the Lebanese government and Hezbollah against each other is a win for the Netanyahu regime, a trap the Lebanese government unfortunately fell into.

Even after the withdrawal of the IOF from two so-called “pilot zones” in Lebanon, Netanyahu did not forget to remind his people that the IOF “does not need” to occupy these Lebanese areas, one of them above the Litani River.

This corroborates what some Israeli circles suggested before the current “ceasefire” took effect: that the IOF had deepened its occupation into certain areas of Lebanon with the intent to later withdraw and bargain with the Lebanese state. This strategy frames the pullback as a “major concession” granted to Trump, who is, under immense public pressure at home over the unprovoked Iran war and is obsessively driven to advance the agreement with Tehran and prevent anything that might disrupt it.

In practical terms, this shifts blame away from the Israeli regime and relieves U.S. pressure, placing the burden on the Lebanese authorities, who must now prove their good intentions, competence, and ability to enforce Israeli conditions by pursuing Hezbollah and disarming it in these areas.

To demonstrate such a qualification, Netanyahu, notoriously famous for inventing pretexts, delays and stalling, will likely drag out this process for months. The withdrawal from the “pilot zones” may even be the first and last of its kind.

What the IOF is doing in Gaza cannot be concealed by relying on supposed “good intentions” or tested American guarantees.

More importantly, the hardline Israeli rhetoric before and during this negotiation round, including repeated official statements rejecting withdrawal from the so-called “yellow line,” exaggerating the difficulty of negotiations, and inflating the idea of the regime’s concessions, serves as a programmed tool of pressure.

It was designed to establish red lines and defensive barriers before President Trump, so that he would settle for these minimal Israeli offerings as the maximum possible allowance for its security concerns, which Washington is assumed to understand.

In doing so, Netanyahu defuses tensions with Trump and restores the previous closeness of relations, after Iran had created a rift that escalated into confrontation and mutual accusations, before the Lebanese government stepped in to bridge the gap with Lebanese blood, sacrifices, dignity, and land.

Moreover, the outcome of this negotiation process carries major significance for the Zionist regime not only in Lebanon, but also in Gaza and possibly Syria, where U.S. demands may clash with Israeli interests. From now on, the Israeli regime’s red lines in Lebanon will serve as non-negotiable thresholds in other arenas as well, even under U.S. pressure or presidential anger.

Israel is also fighting in Lebanon to preserve its deterrence and regional standing, after becoming the subject of ridicule among allies and adversaries alike following the U.S.–Iran memorandum.

Netanyahu understands that what is underway is a broader restructuring of West Asia involving regional and global powers, foremost among them Iran.

Israel believes a major outcome will be decided in Lebanon. Before Lebanon came Syria, and before that Gaza. What is decided today in Lebanon will shape the “Greater Israel” project for years, which is why Netanyahu insists on maintaining his red lines, while the Lebanese authorities surrendered all their colors: red, green, and white flags.

Still, the final measures have not yet been taken by the actual decision-maker on war and peace in Lebanon. Hezbollah has rejected the framework agreement with the Zionist regime and its outcomes as “null and void”, urging Netanyahu not to rush in announcing any “good news” to his settler colonial supporters.