Siasat‑e-Rooz, in its editorial, highlighted the combined military and diplomatic strength of Iran. Iran’s negotiating team represents both power and diplomacy: Ghalibaf is a politician who understands political and military dynamics. The foreign ministry and government members are optimistic about the outcome of the talks.

However, it is too early to express optimism publicly; doing so creates expectations among the public that could have negative consequences if the negotiations reach a dead end. The hope is that the talks will successfully implement the initial understanding and then move toward a final agreement. The heavy, exhausting work will begin once the negotiations enter their main phase. Therefore, the team must be supported to reach the goal.

Javan: Iran did not take the US seriously

Javan, in a commentary, discussed why the Iranian delegation walked away from the negotiating table. Throughout the talks, Trump repeatedly tweeted threats against the Iranian negotiators—something resembling hostage‑taking or even death threats—and insulted Iran’s president, even threatening a return to war. It is obvious that these are the words of a defeated madman whose fate in a forty‑day war became clear. But the negotiating team knows that one of the first clauses of the agreement is that neither side should threaten the other. Perhaps for this reason, when these threats were issued, the Iranian delegation left the venue to impose a procedural pause. Iran showed its upper hand to the United States: first by shifting the agenda from a “memorandum of understanding” to “ending the Lebanon war,” then by refusing to take a group photo with the American delegation at the end of the first round, and finally by temporarily leaving the talks in response to Trump’s repeated threats—demonstrating who is stronger.

Kayhan: The enemy is testing our resolve

Kayhan wrote that the value of the memorandum of understanding lies not in signatures but in repelling enemy threats and demanding compensation for damages. If this is achieved, the agreement has value; otherwise, it does not. A major concern is that some officials involved in the negotiations may fall into a grave miscalculation—believing they are merely pursuing the release of frozen assets—and thus become hesitant or passive, backing down from firmly demanding implementation of the first clause. According to the memorandum, frozen assets should have been released immediately upon implementation. Kayhan warns that the US used empty promises during the JCPOA to keep Iran at the table and prevent it from walking away or halting unilateral implementation. That lesson must not be repeated. Falling into the enemy’s trap of coercion and deception only emboldens it to violate commitments and inflict new damage. The enemy is testing Iran’s determination, and the same firm resolve that pushed it back must continue—without waiting for promises.

Etemad: A document acknowledging the failure of the strategy to eliminate Iran

Etemad focused on the enemy's failure in the war with Iran. It argues that the resistance of the Iranian people, defensive deterrence, and crisis management reversed the course of the war and changed the initial calculations of its planners. The most important strategic outcome of the Ramadan War is the confirmation of a fundamental reality: Iran cannot be eliminated. A country with deep history, exceptional geopolitical position, vast human resources, and extensive energy reserves cannot be removed from regional equations. The past four decades have shown that maximum pressure, military threats, and economic isolation have not changed Iran’s behavior; in many cases, they have strengthened domestic capacities and increased self‑reliance. The Islamabad memorandum should be seen as a product of this new understanding—a document that acknowledges the failure of the “eliminate Iran” strategy and shifts toward a strategy of “managing the reality of Iran.”

Sobh‑e-No: The return of MAGA?

Sobh‑e-No examined J.D. Vance’s opportunism in the current situation. According to the paper, by taking the risk of supporting an agreement with Iran, Vance is trying to turn a political crisis into a golden opportunity for himself. He wants to be seen as a pragmatic figure in contrast to warmongers and to solidify his succession within the MAGA movement. On the other side, the MAGA movement—using Vance as its banner and his role in the Iran agreement—is seeking to rebrand itself and create balance inside the White House in response to criticism of Trump and the “America First” slogan. The movement, which had sought media‑driven branding, was sidelined by Trump’s war against Iran and was even ostracized by him with unprecedentedly harsh language simply for opposing war. As Trump gradually turned into an anti‑MAGA figure, the movement is now trying to rebrand itself through Vance, by distancing itself from Israel and playing a role in the negotiations and agreement with Iran.